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The Solomon Islands’ economy was already showing signs of recovery
when the first peacekeepers from the regional assistance mission
arrived in Honiara in late July of 2003. Cocoa, copra, and log exports
were recovering in response to a recovery in international demand for
these commodities, not least due to a rebound in economic growth in
Asia. The fiscal position of the state, however, and the law and order
situation was fragile until the arrival of the peacekeepers. The early
phase of the intervention has had considerable success in restoring
peace and in disarming the militants. Restored peace and tranquillity,
however, will only last if the economy grows sufficiently rapidly to fulfil
the aspirations of the people. This paper considers the longer-term
challenge of resuscitating growth so as to place the economy on a
higher growth trajectory, as this will be the criterion on which the
success of the mission will ultimately be judged.
The Solomon Islands, once a British
protectorate, and also known as the ‘Happy
Isles’, has been anything but happy since the
eruption of violence in 1999. The economy
has been stagnant since 1990. Most formal
sector activities, including gold mining and
the only large oil palm plantation, take  place
around the capital, Honiara, located on the
island of Guadalcanal. Consequently,
Guadalcanal has attracted a large inflow of
settlers from other parts of the country. The
security challenge faced in Solomon Islands
is a symptom of a lack of development in a
climate of rapid population growth. A
permanent solution, therefore, will involve
accelerating development.
Some 87 per cent of land in Solomon
Islands  is under communal title with 4 per
cent under individual title and the remainder
owned by the state. Thus most of the settle-
ments are on land without secure claims.
Weak delivery of public security has made
the settlers rely on the family and clan to
provide security to property and person. This
has fanned a process of settler communities
built around clan and regional cleavages;
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Honiara is similar to Port Moresby and Port
Vila in this regard. The traditional land-
owners of Guadalcanal, realising the loss of
their claims on the settled land, began
agitating against the settlers. The Guadal-
canal Revolutionary Army (GRA), later the
Istabu Freedom Movement (IFM), was formed
in late 1998; it was instrumental in the initial
violence against the settlers, most of whom
had family ties to the island of Malaita.
Around mid 1999 and at the height of the
violence, some 20,000 Malaitans were forced
off Guadalcanal. The police, alleged to be
taking sides in the conflict, were unable to
contain the violence. An envoy sent by the
Commonwealth Secretariat was also unable
to negotiate peace and bring the violence to a
close. The Malaita Eagle Force (MEF) appeared
around 2000 as a counter force to the GRA.
The escalation in fighting between the GRA
and MEF brought with it the worsening of the
security and law and order situation in
Honiara. In the meantime, the returnees to
Malaita increased tensions on the island as
the influx of people created shortages in access
to cultivable land and basic services.
Australia and New Zealand made a
second attempt to broker peace which led to
the signing of the Townsville Peace Accord
in October 2000. The Accord  had some initial
success in disarming the militants, but the
leader of IFM refused to sign it, and the
fighting intensified—yet another failure to
restore peace. In late 2002 and also after the
2003 Budget had been passed, some police,
who were former militants, extorted public
funds that were earmarked for reducing a
backlog of debt. The two failed attempts at
brokering peace accompanied by a severe
deterioration in law and order called for a
much tougher stance if peace was to be
restored. On 24 July 2003, the first contingent
of 2,225 peacekeepers, led by Australia and
comprising military and police personnel from
Australia, Fiji, New Zealand, Tonga and
Samoa, arrived in Honiara.
The Regional Assistance Mission is
tasked with providing security, restoring law
and order, and rebuilding the machinery of
state where it is broken. Within a month of
their arrival, the peacekeepers restored law
and order and achieved considerable success
in disarming militants. This achievement,
however, is only the beginning. The success
of intervention will ultimately be judged by
a return to peace and tranquillity without
the continuing need for the peacekeepers.
Sustained economic growth sufficient to
provide employment opportunities and
income to enough Solomon Islanders is
critical to such an outcome. The task of
accelerating development has hardly begun
but it will ultimately determine the success
of this mission. The battle will involve
attracting long-term private investments for
growth and creation of income-earning
opportunities for the majority of the people.
Such an outcome requires a significant
reduction in sovereign risk—a return to law
and order is the first step in this long journey.
Much more will need to be done to secure
property rights to future returns from long-
term investments.
The Australian taxpayer will be footing
a bill of approximately A$300 million, nearly
the same as annual aid to Papua New
Guinea in aggregate terms, but some ten times
larger on a per capita basis. The amount of
aid raises two related questions: first, is this
recapitalisation of a ‘failing state’ sufficient
to lift it from its current level to a sustainable
state; and second, can Australia afford such
an outlay over the medium term, particularly
if similar calls are made from other fronts in
the near future.
The foregoing raises questions about
how success in the Solomon Islands will
ultimately be judged. The operation has three
key components—the military component to
provide security, the police component to
install law and order, and a civilian
component to rebuild the machinery of state.
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Even if these goals are achieved within the
next twelve months, what guarantee is there
that the country will not fall back to a crisis
situation once the peacekeepers have left?
Such a reversal following significant invest-
ments will amount to a failure of the
intervention; in order to succeed,  the
intervention has to lift Solomon Islands to a
point where backsliding is unlikely.
Progress of the Regional
Assistance Mission
The mission is to evolve through a series of
stages with some overlap expected between
the intervening stages. The initial deploy-
ment of the military component was to
establish and then maintain security, a feat
that was nearly complete by September 2003.
The police component—given the task of re-
establishing the rule of law—was initiated
soon after the military deployment. Rule of
law had deteriorated considerably on
Guadalcanal, to a lesser degree in Malaita,
and minimally in the rest of the country. The
impact of the breakdown of law and order in
Honiara was felt throughout the nation due
to the centralised nature of the bureaucracy,
and Honiara’s role in international commerce.
It is envisaged that commerce, particularly
within the tree-crop sector  (dormant during
the crisis) will pick up as stability is restored
in Honiara and inter-island shipping
services resume. A boost in exports and
foreign reserves will contribute to a recovery
in public finances (mostly via import tariffs).
Much of the revenue collected will be directed
towards improving access to basic services.
The humanitarian organisations are also
expected to return and begin the task of
emergency assistance, including assisting
people displaced by conflict. The return of
workers to their former employment is
necessary to restore production to levels prior
to the crisis.
While law and order is being restored
and non-governmental organisations are
returning to their roles in the rebuilding
process, the administrative structures of the
state will be revived and strengthened. This
is progressing rapidly at the centre but much
remains to be done beyond Honiara. For much
of the period of conflict, administrative arms
of government away from Honiara were
starved of resources, with cuts in operating
costs and non-payment of salaries and wages.
An injection of fresh resources into the
national budget should see a rapid revival in
the restoration of these services as the capacity
is present, but dormant. Some of the buildings
and systems of government have deteriorated
and will require restoration.
The next step involves restoring fiscal
credibility—beginning with the stabilisation
of the budget. While revenues for the first six
months of 2003 have been growing, expend-
iture has outpaced income growth such that
the budget deficit to June 2003 had blown
out to approximately 8 per cent of GDP, after
having reached 11 per cent in 2002. A large
part of the blow-out can be attributed to ‘extra-
budgetary’ outlays, constituting payments
made under duress to militants by the
Ministry of Finance. Seventeen experts were
posted to the Ministry of Finance in September
2003 with the primary responsibility of
restoring integrity to financial and economic
management. Their task will include carrying
out a stocktake of the state of public finances,
including arrears, development of a credible
strategy to retire arrears over time, eradication
of unbudgeted extravagances, and building
up the revenue base for the public sector.
The task of stabilising the budget,
particularly if the Australian Treasury
provides budgetary support over the
immediate term, could be relatively easy.
Building this to a sustainable position such
that basic services are funded from internally
generated revenue will be a lot more difficult.
This would be particularly problematic if
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moral hazard in extending the assistance is
to be minimised.
The task of rebuilding state institutions
requires investment in enhancing domestic
capacity right from the start; this process will
be critical for a smooth transfer of
responsibility for policymaking as external
support is withdrawn. It may be wise to start
this process immediately. Posting experts with
line responsibilities and direct accountability
to Canberra runs the risk of displacing, and
in the process demoralising, local staff who
will ultimately take over the reins of running
the state. Considered thought must be given
now to ensure that the newly injected
expertise into Honiara complements rather
than displaces local capacity. Furthermore,
the transition process for handing over
responsibility for policymaking should begin
at the start with identification and training
of staff with key positions filled in a systemic
and systematic fashion. The resource
implications of such a process has to be built
into the program with clear milestones
identified from the start. Creating realistic
expectations on the part of the Australian
taxpayer regarding their commitment to the
mission is part of this process. Similarly, the
expectations of Solomon Islanders must also
be managed, to minimise gaps between
reality and perceptions.
The next phase of the mission will entail
growing the capital base by expanding
physical infrastructure and improving
access to basic services such as primary
education and basic healthcare. It is envisaged
that international donors who have the funds
and necessary expertise will become heavily
involved at this stage. The onus will be on
the planners to ensure that new public
investments provide the best possible return.
For fiscal sustainability, returns on loan-
funded projects must be sufficient to cover
repayments.1 Australia has paid off Solomon
Island debt service areas to international
financial institutions (IFIs), namely the Asian
Development Bank and the World Bank, in
the hope of engaging them in the develop-
ment stage. The IFIs have expressed their
willingness to re-engage in the development
of Solomon Islands. The onus of due diligence
in respect of public investments funded by
the IFIs must rest with those providing the
funds, and the Australian taxpayer should
be spared the responsibility of underwriting
these loans. The perception that the
Australian Treasury will bail out the Solomon
Islands could be counterproductive.
The final stage will be to establish an
environment that will attract sufficiently
large business and foreign capital to generate
income-earning opportunities for the majority
of the people. The regulatory changes
necessary for lowering barriers to foreign
investment will be relatively straightforward,
but reforms to property rights to land to
enable long-term investments in land and
buildings could be problematic. The last has
been a sticking point in all of Melanesia:
proposals for land reform have resulted in
political rallies, riots and loss of seats in
national parliament in Papua New Guinea
and Fiji. Proposals for reforming the existing
systems to provide long-term and secure
access to land (rather than changing the
ownership of land) will have to be treated
cautiously given political sensitivities. It will,
however, be equally difficult to attract long-
term investment while maintaining
competitive rates of return on investments
without such reform. For example, the high
interest rates on borrowing and the prevalence
of ‘high grading’ in mining and logging are
the direct result of insecure access to land
and land-based resources.
The intervention will be a costly failure
if it is not able to reach this final stage. Only
then will the need for an external force to
ensure peace and stability expire. Such a
position requires the emergence of an
economy able to provide income-earning
opportunities for the bulk of the population
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and resources sufficient to fund and maintain
institutions of civil society. The current state
of the economy is well short of meeting this
requirement—thus the challenge for the
interveners is to recapitalise the economy to
the point where backsliding is least likely.
The current state of the economy
By developing economy standards, Solomon
Islands is not a desperately poor country.
Even after the fall in per capita GDP of 30 per
cent since the beginning of the conflict to
US$590 in 2002, most of the social indicators
of development are better than neighbouring
Papua New Guinea and much in accord
with the rest of Melanesia. For example,
average life expectancy of 69 years (Table 1)
is comparable to Fiji (69) and Vanuatu (68)
while the population density of 13 people
per square kilometre is amongst the lowest
in the region.2 While the level of income and
other indicators of development do not
suggest mass poverty, the stagnant economy
with a population growing at 2.8 per cent
annually provide ample reasons for concern.
The population growth momentum is likely
to remain for a generation as some 42 per
cent of the population is below 15 years of
age. Furthermore, the distribution of income
is highly skewed, for example, average
household income in Honiara is four times
that of rural households while the top one
per cent of the households in Honiara share
approximately 90 per cent of the total income
(Solomon Islands 2003). According to the
1999 census, 61 per cent of the 14 to 29 year
age group were in search of paid work. Many
of these youth move to urban centres, Honiara
in particular, in search of employment.
The economy was stagnant well before
the beginning of the conflict. The lack of
employment opportunities in a climate of
rapid population growth contributed to the
conflict while the conflict itself dragged an
already stagnant economy down further
compounding the initial problems (Chand
2002). The conflict exacerbated a worsening
unemployment problem; according to a
Central Bank of Solomon Islands (CBSI 2003)
survey, some 8,000 people had lost formal
sector jobs through redundancies or were
sent on unpaid leave following the crisis.
The economy was showing signs of
recovery for the six months to June 2003.
Exports of round logs, cocoa, copra, and fish
were growing, with foreign reserves reaching
US$30 million, equivalent to two months of
import cover (Hou 2003). These gains have
been made as a result of improvements in
law and order and some rebound in inter-
national prices for exports (Hou 2003). The
fiscal position, however, remains tight. The
budget deficit to June 2003 amounted to
Table 1 Solomon Islands basic statistics, compared to Papua New Guinea, 2001
Solomon Islands Papua New Guinea
Population (‘000s, estimate) 430.8 5,300.0
Gross national income (GNI) per capita (US$, estimate) 590.0 580.0
Fertility rate 5.3 4.4
Life expectancy (years) 68.9 57.2
Note: The fertility rate is defined as the number of births per woman.
Source: World Bank, 2003. World Tables, World Bank, Washington, DC. Country profile sourced from http:/
/devdata.worldbank.org.
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SI$43.3 million, equivalent to 8 per cent of
GDP (Hou 2003). Public-debt levels of the
state at approximately SI$1.6 billion is well
above the level of GDP. Debt arrears to June
2003 had risen to SI$197.5 million,
constituting a major drag on the growth of
private enterprise and the financial sector.
The major constraints to a quicker rebound,
particularly in the aftermath of the restoration
of law and order, are the poor state of
infrastructure, the high cost of credit and the
insecurity of property rights, including access
to land.
Over the period of the conflict the
government has built up arrears to the private
sector. These unpaid debts are putting a
severe strain on the cash flows of the private
sector whilst driving up interest rates in an
already contracting economy. The govern-
ment first defaulted on its external debt
repayments of SI$9 million in 1995; by the
end of 2002 external debt arrears had soared
to SI$83 million with debt service exceeding
20 per cent of non-grant revenues (Solomon
Islands 2003). As access to foreign financing
was lost, the National Bank of Solomon
Islands (NBSI), the National Provident Fund
(NPF)  and the CBSI were increasingly called
upon to finance the deficits; government debt
with the CBSI at the end of 2002 totalled
SI$178.6 million, well above the legal ceiling
of 40 per cent of revenues averaged over the
preceding three years. Total government debt
as at the end of 2002 is estimated to be
SI$1,635 million, of which SI$1,087.3 million
(equal to 66 per cent) is external (Solomon
Islands 2003).
It is highly unlikely that the economy will
be able to service its debt for the foreseeable
future. This will continue to put pressure on
interest rates, given the high sovereign risk.
The exchange rate risk has been high as well:
the SI dollar was devalued by 25 per cent in
2002 but then revalued by the same amount
a few days later. In the meantime, deposit
rates fell with the average interest rate on
deposits falling from 3.8 per cent in 1998 to
0.6 per cent by the end of 2002. For much of
the period of the conflict real interest rates
(net of inflation) on deposits were negative.
The weighted average interest rate on loans,
in contrast, increased in the same period from
14.1 per cent in 1998 to 16 per cent in 2002.
Interest rate spread rose from 10.9 percentage
points in 1998 to 16 percentage points in
2002, while conditions for issue of credit to
the private sector were made even more
stringent. The high cost of credit reflects the
exchange rate and sovereign risk premiums.
While on the one hand, clearing such debt
by the interveners could provide a much-
needed boost to private commerce, it will also
create problems of moral hazard and could
also be seen as rewarding corruption to the
Table 2 Broad trends in some of the aggregates
Start of crisis End of crisis Change
            (per cent of GDP)
GDP (US$ million) 372.0 (1998) 283.0 (2002) –89.0 (31 per cent)
Stock of external debt (US$ million)a 210.0 (1998) 284.0 (2002) 74.0
Inflation 13.0 (1997) 8.5 (2001)          Stable?
Net foreign assets (US$ million) 49.374 18.859 –30.514
a The debt data is from IMF sources converted at the official exchange rate.
Source: The World Bank country profile data accessed via http://devdata.worldbank.org
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extent that such debt was built up under
dubious circumstances. Similarly, the use of
the Australian dollar instead of the domestic
currency will eliminate the exchange rate
premium so long as fiscal sustainability is
maintained.
Sectoral growth prospects
The large injection of foreign personnel into
Honiara will see a surge in output as demand
for housing, utilities, and food products
increases. Imports will surge as construction
materials, fuel and other inputs from abroad
are brought in to meet most of this rise in
demand. Most will, however, be confined to
the urban sector and Honiara in particular.
The tree crop sector, copra and cocoa in
particular, have been dormant and will rise
as costs of production fall and prices received
by the producer at the village level rise.
Regular shipping services for transporting
copra have been a major hurdle; a void left by
the closure of the marketing board and one
that the private sector has been slow to fill.
This has been less of a problem for cocoa as it
is less bulky and has a longer storage life. The
closure of the Solomon Islands Plantation
Limited (SIPL) resulted in the loss of 2,000 jobs,
the decimation of the oil palm sector, and a
sharp fall in cocoa production. Since the
majority of the workers in SIPL were originally
from Malaita, the reopening of the plantation
is unlikely in the short term, given the
problems with return migration. Owners of
the land on which SIPL is located have made
fresh demands and the resolution of these will
also take time. It is estimated that some US$20
million is required just to repair damaged
property and to bring SIPL into operation.
Solomon Islands is located on the ‘rim of
fire’, thus has mineral prospects with
known deposits of nickel, silver and gold.
Commencement of mining in the near future,
however, is unlikely. Gold Ridge, the only mine
in operation prior to the conflict, is unlikely to
re-open in the short term given continuing
negotiations with landowners on  secure and
long-term access to the resource. In the
meantime much of the capital equip-
ment at the mine site has been stolen, damaged
or fallen into disrepair. Some US$100 million
is required to bring the mine to its former
operational stage. Investors in the mine will
need long-term secure access to the ores with
profits sufficient to justify the large investment
required to restarting mining.
Solomon Islands’  largest manufacturer,
Solomon Taiyo Limited (STL) tuna cannery,
has been operating at 40 per cent capacity as
catch levels have fallen with the deteriorating
security situation. In August 2001, a year
after the withdrawal of Maruha  Corporation
of Japan as the joint partner in STL, the
Government incorporated a new company—
Soltai Fishing and Processing Limited
(SFPL)—to take over operations of STL. There
is significant potential for expansion of the
industry as the government-issued total
allowable catch of 120,000 tonnes per annum
is yet to be taken up. Such expansion,
however, requires foreign investment.
Log exports are continuing but at an
unsustainably high level: at the current rate
of harvest, log exports for 2003 will reach a
record 800,000 cubic metres. The
continuation of harvesting at current rates
will see the resource depleted in less than a
decade (Solomon Islands 2003). There is
evidence of ‘high grading’ of the resource,
that is, the best natural forests and previously
undisturbed areas are being harvested with
minimal concern for conservation and the
extent of soil degradation. In terms of sectoral
prospects, there is potential for growth in
construction and utilities in the immediate
term but the sustainable sources of growth
can only come from the primary sectors.
Secure property rights to returns from such
investments and a more competitive interest
rate are prerequisites for the above.
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Reforms necessary to increase
private sector participation
The economy will be revived in the immediate
term with increased resources and demand—
thanks to the intervention force. This growth
spurt, however, will last only while demand
remains. Given its resource endowments, the
small domestic market and the failure of state-
owned enterprises, growth will have to be
sourced from the private sector. Such growth
can only be sustained in an internationally
competitive climate where production is
concentrated in sectors in which the country
has a comparative advantage.
The roles of policy in creating such an
environment is relatively clear. These revolve
around providing an environment conducive
for private commerce. Foremost among these
is the removal of regulatory impediments to
trade in goods and services as well as to
foreign direct investment. The existing regime
relating to import licenses, cumbersome
processes relating to obtaining investment
approvals, and restrictions on the issue of
work permits to foreign investors must be
minimised and simplified. The second area
requiring  urgent attention is the prohibitively
high rates of interest on borrowings. Such high
rates make only those investments with
commensurate rates of return commercially
viable; inevitably this is in sectors with
significant rents such as in the resource sector.
Policy instability, originating from large
discretionary powers vested in the
bureaucracy or political leadership, is a
serious disincentive to long-term investment.
This must be addressed to secure private, long-
term investment in land, buildings and
physical infrastructure. Import licences and
tax exemptions have been issued in the past
with little transparency or predictability.
Insecurity of access to land following the
closure of SIPL and Gold Ridge mine have
encouraged short-term investment only in
projects providing the highest returns. While
such insecurities prevail, ‘high grading’   will
continue. Success of imbedding principles of
good governance will be critical to reviving
long-term investment by the private sector.
Policymakers will have to address the
insecurity of access to land as an immediate
priority. This has often been placed in the ‘too
hard’ basket in Solomon Islands and the rest
of Melanesia, and will require leadership,
significant determination and public
education of the various stakeholders.
However, Papua New Guinea provides a
good example, where discussion of the
individualisation of title to customary land
(through long-term leasehold) has moved
from being a ‘no-go’ topic only a few years
ago to where it is an everyday topic in the
newspapers.
Supply of secure property rights and a
legal system that enables contracting with
confidence will reduce the cost of credit, and
provide a much-needed boost to domestic
investment. Considerations must also be
given to the introduction of an effective
secured transactions framework such as crop
liens and mortgages on movable assets to
lower the cost of credit.
The domestic financial sector is heavily
burdened with debt to government. At the
end of 2002, the stock of government bonds
held by the National Bank of Solomon
Islands (NBSI) amounted to SI$91 million
while the corresponding figure for the
National Provident Fund (NPF) was SI$56
million. This is in contrast to holdings of
government bonds by the ANZ and Westpac
Banks of SI$34 million and SI$25 million,
respectively (Solomon Islands 2002:97). The
holders of government debt are forced to roll
it over at an administratively-set interest rate
of 3 per cent,  considerably lower than in the
original contract and consequently being
challenged in court by NBSI. The domestic
financial sector will be under severe strain if
the value of government debt is marked
down to realistic levels. As an example,
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member contributions to the NPF at the end
of 2002 amounted to SI$317 million while
the book value of assets, without any
adjustment for the quality of the assets, was
SI$ 366 million. It is highly unlikely that NPF
will be able to meet its future cash-flow
obligations in respect of member entitlements
without budgetary support. Commercial
banks are already factoring this problem into
their dealings with clients as deposits with
the NPF can no longer be used as collateral
to secure personal loans. The risks of a
collapse of the financial sector are ominous
as similar problems in Vanuatu in 1997 led
to riots on the street of Port Vila, leading to
the launch of a comprehensive reform
program.
The genuineness of some of the public
debt is questionable; thus, clearing out of such
debt by donors will entail problems of moral
hazard. Determining the status of this debt
will take time; moreover, given resource
constraints, clearing of all public debt may
not be feasible in the immediate term. One
strategy worth detailed consideration is to
quarantine all debt accumulated prior to the
arrival of the technical team in the Ministry of
Finance to be carefully examined. Such a
strategy should be made public with a
guarantee that any future claims for goods
and services provided to the State under
appropriate authorisation from the Ministry
of Finance will be honoured. This will lower
the sovereign-risk premium while placing
pressure on businesses with claims on the
state to prove the legitimacy of their claims.
Fiscal credibility could be enhanced in the
process.
Finally, reforms inevitably create losers
and winners, even when the economy grows
as a result. The losers, therefore, have an
incentive to resist reforms. The threat of
resistance to reforms cannot be
underestimated. The experience of the last
three Fijian coups suggests that when the
underlying motive is greed, communities
can be manipulated along ethnic lines into
resisting reforms on the basis of
manufactured grievances.
Conclusion
The Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon
Islands has regained security within a short
time and is well on the way to restoring law
and order in this highly fragmented island
nation. This is the first step in a long journey
to achieving lasting peace and long-term
economic development. The success of the
intervention will be judged by its ability to
raise economic growth to a level sufficient to
generate income-earning opportunities for the
majority of the people. In such an environ-
ment, the majority of the workforce is engaged
in value-adding activity and thus has neither
the time nor the incentive to engage in socially
disruptive behaviour. A well-trained and well-
resourced law enforcement agency with
community support should be able to contain
any frictions, thus minimising the chance of a
repetition of the chaos seen in the recent past.
The restoration of law and order is important
but it is only a means to achieving develop-
ment sufficient to reach a point where
backsliding is unlikely.
A number of necessary conditions will
have to be met for the economy to grow
sufficiently rapidly to be able to satisfy the
aspirations of the majority of the people. A
return to fiscal prudence, orderly clearing of
arrears built up by the public sector, and
reduction of debt to sustainable levels is a
necessary initial undertaking. Public sector
reforms involving the downsizing of the
workforce in Honiara,3 a shift in expenditure
away from recurrent outlays and into service
delivery and development, and devolution
of responsibility with commensurate
resources to local authorities must be
pursued from the start. Public capital
development including strengthening of the
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law enforcement agencies and the delivery
of basic services and public infrastructure
must be built to levels sufficient to lower the
costs of private commerce. Anything less
would amount to undercapitalising a failing
state and leaving it vulnerable to rolling back
into the stage from it was initially rescued.
The developmental challenge is one of
transforming an economy dependent on a
narrow, urban-based public sector to a
private sector-led and more diversified
economy that draws on the productive
potential of the entire nation. The role for
government in such an economy falls into
three broad categories: first, as a provider of
basic services such as basic healthcare and
primary education; second, as a provider of
regulatory control over public goods,
including regulatory supervision of the
financial sector and natural monopolies; and
third, investment in and maintenance of
public infrastructure.
The intervention force together with the
development partners have a significant role
to play in recapitalising Solomon Islands to
a position where the virtuous circle of growth
in income-earning opportunities for the
general population support institutions of
civil society, whilst drawing people away
from socially disruptive and often predatory
behaviour. It is only when such a process
has begun can the peacekeepers leave the
country with an assurance of lasting peace
and prosperity.
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Notes
1 The social rate of return from a public
investment must exceed the opportunity cost
of capital for the net worth of the state to
improve from such outlays; implementing
such a test is not easy, thus the more restrictive
and simpler requirement of commercial
viability.
2 Data on both Solomon Islands and Papua
New Guinea are of poor quality, thus care
has to be taken in interpreting the figures
quoted here.
3 The public sector accounted for 24 per cent
of formal sector employment in 1998 and
possibly a lot more subsequently as the
private sector contracted whilst new police
constables were hired during the period of
the conflict.
References
Central Bank of Solomon Islands, 2003.
Quarterly Report, March, Central Bank of
Solomon Islands, Honiara.
Chand, S., 2002. ‘Conflict to crisis in
Solomon Islands’, Pacific Economic
Bulletin, 17(1):154–9.
Hou, R., 2003. Solomon Islands—Update
on various issues, 4 August, Central
Bank of Solomon Islands, Honiara,
unpublished.
Solomon Islands, 2002. Multi-Donor
Economic Governance Mission Report, 12
November to 3 December, Government
of Solomon Islands, Honiara.
——, 2003. National Economic Recovery and
Development Plan 2003–2005,
Government of Solomon Islands,
Honiara.
World Bank, 2003. World Tables, World
Bank, Washington, DC.
